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Abstract 
We outline the concept of an open technology platform which builds upon a publicly 
accessible library of fluidic designs, manufacturing processes and experimental 
characterisation, as well as virtualisation by a ‘digital twin” based on modelling, simulation 
and cloud computing. Backed by the rapidly emerging Web3 technology “Blockchain”, we 
significantly extend traditional approaches to effectively incentivise broader participation by 
an interdisciplinary ‘value network’ of diverse players. Ranging from skilled individuals (the 
‘citizen scientist’, the ‘garage entrepreneur’) and more established research institutions to 
companies with their infrastructures, equipment and services, the novel platform approach 
enables all stakeholders to jointly contribute to value creation along more decentralised 
supply chain designs including research and technology development (RTD). 
Blockchain-enabled “Wisdom of the Crowds” and “Skin in the game” mechanisms secure 
“trust” and transparency between participants. Prediction markets are created for guiding 
decision making, planning and allocation of funding; competitive parallelisation of work and 
its validation from independent participants substantially enhances quality, credibility and 
speed of project outcomes in the real world along the entire path from RTD, fabrication and 
testing to eventual commercialisation. This novel, Blockchain-backed open platform concept 
can be led by a corporation, academic entity, a loosely organised group, or even 
“chieflessly” within a smart-contract encoded Decentralised Autonomous Organisation 
(DAO). 
The proposed strategy is particularly attractive for highly interdisciplinary fields like Lab-on-a-
Chip systems in the context of manifold applications in the Life Sciences. As an exemplar, 
we outline the centrifugal microfluidic “Lab-on-a-Disc” technology. Rather than engaging in 
all sub-disciplines themselves, many smaller, highly innovative actors can focus on 
strengthening the product component distinguishing their unique selling point (USP), e.g., a 
particular bioassay, detection scheme or application scenario. In this effort, system 
integrators access underlying commons like fluidic design, manufacture, instrumentation and 
software from a more resilient and diversified supply chain, e.g., based on a verified pool of 
community-endorsed or certified providers. 
Introduction 
It is now widely recognised that manufacturing “value chains” including initial design, testing 
and optimisation stages, to production ramp-up and in-use activities are critical in 
  
transforming new technologies and ideas into marketable products. However, how best to 
manage critical network resources in the design and setup of enabling (yet often) ‘nascent’ 
supply chains is poorly understood and executed. Forming and growing a ‘resilient’ supply 
chain should be a critical component in the design of a platform-based business model. 
In such platform-based strategies that have been widely adopted by mature industries like 
automotive since the later 1970s [1], a wide range of products are derived from a joint, 
modular architecture so components, processes and services can be shared internally and / 
or with suppliers. Such platform approaches accelerate, de-risk and reduce costs for 
research & technology development (RTD) and subsequent manufacture and configurability 
of new products; related formal or internal standards also allow forging comprehensive RTD 
capabilities and supply chains composed of specialist players as a hallmark of modern, task-
sharing economies. The availability of a critical market size and diversity of its members 
constitutes a key prerequisite for such platform strategies; otherwise, the set up cost for 
such a generalised approach would be excessive, the risk high and, hence, the overall 
incentive for (independent) parties to embark rather low. 
The Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) “Blockchain” [2, 3] has already proven to afford a 
high level of trust and transparency to financial transactions for fuelling collaboration in the 
digital world; its “smart contracts” are mostly executed on the (nearly [4]) Turing-complete 
“Ethereum Virtual Machine” (EVM) [5] without the need for a middleman. Beyond such 
decentralised finance (“DeFi”), our new approach expands the concept of Blockchain-
endowed trust to the real world of product development for crowdsourcing of work, expertise, 
infrastructure and services along the entire pipeline from idea generation, funding, RTD and 
production and marketing.  
By competitive parallelisation of work and their validation, our novel concept resorts to 
“Wisdom of the Crowds” [6-8] or “Collective intelligence” [9] principles including Blockchain, 
typically Ethereum-enabled bounty networks [10] and prediction markets [11] for finding best 
possible “truth” as a foundation of governance and decision making, as well as assessment 
of technical progress and future, technological or commercial prospects, e.g., return-on-
investment. This comprehensive crowdsourcing strongly relies on well established “Skin in 
the game” mechanisms like proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, formalised reputation [12], staking, 
governance and arbitration [13, 14] schemes. Funding can be leveraged through blockchain-
based seigniorage [15] as well as recently proposed crowdfunding [16, 17], initial coin / 
token offerings (ICOs / ITOs), curation markets [18, 19] and token bonding curves [20]. 
Amongst the wide scope of applications, this paper exemplifies the implementation and 
benefits of the novel, blockchain-backed open platform concept for “Lab-on-a-Chip” systems. 
The primary commercial use cases of these microfluidic devices are biomedical in-vitro 
diagnostics (IVD) at the point-of-care (PoC), tools for life-science (research), and monitoring 
industrial processes, infrastructures and the environment. The present global market for 
such microfluidic devices and products is valued well above 10 billion USD [21]. 
Conventional platform concepts [22] and standards [23-27] have already been suggested for 
such Lab-on-a-Chip systems. However, the vast majority of these microfluidics-based 
products still addresses comparatively small niche markets for which it is extremely hard to 
recover upfront investment, e.g., for RTD and production; nevertheless, companies are still 
quite hesitant to share their technology portfolio outside their own contract suppliers. 
This paper first outlines the basics of open platform models for the representative case of 
the modular, centrifugal microfluidic “Lab-on-a-Disc” (LoaD) platform. It then elaborates 
present bottlenecks for wider-scale commercial success of this special variant of Lab-on-a-
  
Chip technology. Next, “Wisdom of the Crowds” mechanisms in connection with their 
blockchain-based implementation and reward schemes are elaborated. After the final 
summarise, we discuss further synergies, opportunity and challenges. 
Platforms 
Technology platforms create a variety of applications, e.g., to address different market 
segments, from a common set of design rules, materials, processes, components and 
development tools. Prominent examples are car platforms ( e.g., Volkswagen Group, 
Toyota, GM, Fiat, Mitsubishi, Ford, Mazda, Chrysler, Hyundai-Kia) defining essential 
architecture such as floorplan, wheelbase, steering mechanism, suspensions and 
wheelbase [28]. Economy-of-scale effects markedly reduce cost (per unit) of RTD for the 
product and production technologies, and lower the number of parts in the inventory, 
promote quality, enhance reliability, enable customisation and facilitate logistics. Computing 
platforms provide an environment for executing programmes; there are different levels, such 
as browsers, programme suites, operating systems, software, hardware, and combinations 
thereof [29, 30]. 
In strictly proprietary platforms, these core elements are sourced internally, or from 
designated contract suppliers who are bound to confidentiality and / or exclusivity. This 
restrictive policy can be lifted by publishing standards, e.g., for component interfaces or test 
methods, to attract more players and thus to create choice for buyers and to relax the 
dependence of specialised suppliers from a single organisation; yet, certain key enabling 
intellectual property (IP) including know-how may remain confidential, e.g., kept as a trade 
secret by in internal group or filed as patent, to shield the product against competition. In any 
case, the formation of such platforms vitally requires the involvement of a critical mass of 
participants and a matching market demand. Therefore, it is much easier for established, 
large-scale industries and their conglomerates to organise a “closed” supply chain.  
Open platforms release information needed to participate in the RTD and supply chain to 
stimulate the engagement of multiple parties, thus inducing crucial economy-of-scale effects 
for seminally augmenting quality, speed and cost. Especially smaller, highly innovative 
system integrators can thus efficiently outsource essential elements, such as materials, 
manufacture and specialised services, to a commercial network while leaving sufficient room 
to distinguish their own value proposition and USPs, e.g., their distinctive methods or 
application spaces. The benefits of such open platform approaches are likely to significantly 
outweigh drawbacks such as potential loss of IP on common aspects of the product that may 
be shared with competitors. 
Example: Lab-on-a-Disc 
Technology 
In the wide arena of microfluidic systems, platform concepts [22] and related standards [23-
27] have been propagated for quite a while. To further illustrate the extended, open platform 
concept presented in this paper, we consider the specific use case of centrifugal microfluidic 
systems which have been developed by many commercially [31-35] and academically [36-
46] driven initiatives since the 1990s. On these “Lab-on-a-Disc” (LoaD) systems (Figure 1), 
liquid samples and reagents are pumped and conditioned by the a centrifugal field which is 
modulated by the spin rate of the rotor. While a variety of geometrical formats of microfluidic 
chips which displays a network of miniaturised chambers and interconnecting channels have 
been utilised, a disc of similar size as optical storage media (e.g., CD, DVD or Blu-Ray) is 
still a common shape. Its exceptional capability of larger-scale (functional) integration (LSI) 
on the LoaD enables comprehensive sample-to-answer automation and parallelisation for 
  
“point-of-use” scenarios as a critical USP with major markets in bioanalytical point-of-care 
diagnostics, tools for life-science research and the biopharmaceutical industry. A ‘White 
Paper’ type document [47] is currently issued as a foundational element to encourage and 
enable broad participation of RTD communities and supply chains. In particular “digital twin” 
concepts [48] in connection with widely available cloud computing will shift the emphasis 
from experimental to in silico design optimisation, and thus massively open up participation 
in crowdsourcing of RTD. 
  
Figure 1 Lab-on-a-Disc (LoaD) systems feature a modular setup of a single-use, polymer chip, often of similar 
geometry as common optical storage media like CD, DVD or Blu-ray, which features a netwerk of chambers for 
batch-wise conditioning os (bio-)samples and reagents. These chambers represent Laboratory Units Operations 
(LUOs) such as metering, mixing, aliquoting, purification, concentration and particle separation which are 
sequentially processed in a abtch-wise fashion along a conventional laboratory protocol through normally-closed 
valves placed at their interconnecting channels. 
Modularity, whether by hardware or design, constitutes a key enabler for platform strategies. 
On a component level, the LoaD features an instrument which is essentially assembled from 
a simple spindle motor, electronic control and (mostly optical) detection units; this “player” 
receives a typically single-use (polymer) cartridge which fully contains the sample and 
reagents, while safely retaining potentially (bio-)hazardous waste; the contact-free, field-
induced pressurisation of the chip-based liquids supersedes the need for maintenance-
prone fluidic or pneumatic interfaces to the player. The variant of the LoaD platforms 
considered here [49-63] also allows a second level of modularisation where assay protocols 
are run in a batch-wise “stop-and-go” fashion along a sequence of Laboratory Unit 
Operations (LUOs), such as metering, mixing and particle filtering, each of which is 
independently controlled by a rotationally actuated, normally-closed valve at its 
interconnecting outlet. 
Similar to common lumped-element models for electronic circuitry, a layout can be well 
represented by a network of parallel or serially connected fluidic equivalents of resistors, 
capacitors, inductances, diodes, relays and routers which are powered by voltage or current 
sources. By virtue of their functionally modular architecture, LoaD systems can hence be 
described and simulated by lumped-element models where LUOs and valves are 
characterised by reduced-dimension transfer functions. Importantly, the availability of 
accurate modelling of liquid handling on the LoaD allows to directly derive component 
performance and reliability from geometrical tolerances related to device manufacture to 
rapidly raise Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) [64]. 
The modular setup and predictability of fluidic function from basic manufacturing tolerances 
creates a sound basis for crowdsourcing of RTD. In addition, and similar to mature industries 
such as electronics and Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS), capable supply chains 
  
can be built around foundries to significantly accelerate, de-risk and economise the 
development of new applications. 
Supply Chain 
With modularity of its foundational technologies and scope applications, LoaD systems are 
particularly amenable to the platform concept. However, in line with other emerging industry-
type examples, e.g., ‘plastic electronics’, that are often characterised by new and innovative 
manufacturing processes driven by individual actors and new enterprises [65], single-
handed development is still prevalent amongst start-up companies in the arena of 
microfluidics.  
Given the specialist nature and a limited pool of suppliers in terms of, e.g., specialised 
manufacture, the current modus operandi is to carry out contract work under strict 
confidentiality or exclusivity arrangements. As well as failing to take advantage of 
technological synergies and economies-of-scale, the underlying risk is that one becomes 
merely ‘reactive’ in response to competitor strategies [66, 67]. In the absence of widely 
accepted standards, a platform-based mechanism paired with blockchain-enabled 
incentivisation schemes presented here can boost market driving strategies where an actor 
or enterprise may proactively influence the competitive landscape and industry standards 
[68, 69]. 
Apart from somewhat valid concerns on sharing IP and trade secrets, this legacy corporate 
culture is also rooted in the huge variety of underlying microfluidic concepts, often requiring 
development from scratch for most of their technological constituents. Actors and small 
emerging firms then focus their efforts on resolving associated technical issues and 
developing prototypes while early ‘non-technical’ requirements are often overlooked. 
As a result, research in the area of emerging industries has typically concentrated on the 
technology side, coupled with particular technology-specific commercialisation challenges. 
However, the ‘industrial ecosystem’ is much more complex, and cannot be readily described 
by a single viewpoint [70]. For example, it is argued that emergence is largely dependent on 
the parallel development of a ‘new’ supply chain or network to flank such commercialisation 
activities [71]. Yet, the design, setup and operation of enabling supply chains, in the context 
of emerging industries, is poorly understood. One key challenge is the lack of a defined 
strategy that a firm can follow due to the uncertainty which often forces entrepreneurs to 
experiment with multiple choices for supply chain designs [72]. 
For example, supplier identification has both a long- and short-term impact on supplier 
selection and the performance of entire supply chains [73]. This selection process can be 
very time consuming – leading to increased time-to-market and making it difficult to maintain 
(or achieve) critical ‘first mover advantage’ [72]. As a result, identification and compilation of 
an appropriate pool of trusted suppliers has become an integral part of the supplier selection 
process [74].  
The proposed open platform concept can contribute to improve management of critical 
network resources in the setup of enabling ‘nascent’ supply chains, and allow system 
integrators to access shared assets (e.g., fluidic design, manufacture, instrumentation and 
software) from more resilient supply chain setups (a verified pool of certified suppliers 
enabled by an open platform concept). 
Even though there have been significant success stories in the world of microfluidic 
technologies, a large number of projects are smothered by often completely underestimated 
costs of bespoke facilities for (manufacturing) scale-up; it is typically only realised in 
  
retrospect that greater numbers of microfluidic devices, ideally produced by the eventual 
mass fabrication scheme, are required well before eventual market entry to optimise and 
properly validate functional reliability with sound statistics and assay performance towards 
passing internal quality checks and regulatory compliance [75]. 
 
Figure 2 Exemplary pipeline from idea to a unique microfluidic, e.g., “Lab-on-a-Disc” product. The proprietary part 
underpinning the Unique Selling Points (USPs) comprises of the original idea of an assay protocol, its reagents 
or application including specific optimisation cost, performance, productisation and marketing; the embedded, 
shared part comprises of a library of fluidic designs, testing and manufacturing methods which sourced from a 
common, multi-player RTD and supply chain, e.g., following foundry-type business models which are, for 
instance, well-proven in the electronics / MEMS [76, 77] or photonics [78] industries. 
Figure 2 depicts a possible concept how an open platform can distribute the development 
and scale-up fabrication of LoaD technologies based on a supply chain for providing 
commons like fluidic design, manufacture and testing. Similar to successful business 
structures in big industries such as electronics, this model is likely to stimulate the formation 
of foundries [76] which provide digital-twin supported design-for-manufacture (DfM) for 
delivering highly predictable functionality of components and devices. The responsibility for 
such “commons” is thus taken from the shoulders of innovative system integrators who can 
align their resources on progressing their ring-fenced competitive edge, e.g., on behalf of 
their distinctive know-how on bioassays, or their applications and market access. 
 “Wisdom of the Crowds” 
The idea that collective intelligence tends to supersede the quality of individual assessment 
was pushed since the early 2000s [6]. This section reviews instances where “Wisdom of the 
Crowds” principles have been successfully applied in the social Web2.0 and science to pave 
the way for its implementation for crowdsourcing of work, expertise, infrastructure and 
services for RTD projects in the next section on related blockchain technologies. 
Social Web 
Already in the social Web 2.0, “wisdom of the crowds” has been extensively implemented, 
e.g., in social media (e.g., “likes”, “followers”) and online shopping (e.g., ratings and 
comments by buyers and sellers), which, as a positive knock-on effect, also boost customer 
engagement [79, 80]. Especially in dearth of other objective sources, information obtained 
from the crowd can be very useful, and many portals have managed to widely suppress 
manipulation. For instance, tapping into the crowd has also proven to be very useful for 
aggregating information on the “state of the world”, e.g., real-time updates on transport 
networks or footfall in local shops; even emerging pandemics such as Covid-19 have been 
identified and reported at a very early stage [81-83].  
  
Finding “Truth” in Science and RTD 
The need for decision making in absence of “absolute truth” particularly applies to the realm 
of projects in science and RTD which coarsely follow a sequence of conception, planning, 
evaluation, implementation and exploitation. In principle, all these phases are susceptible to 
subjectivism, misjudgement, undeliberate error and even deceit, whether from the 
originators or their assessors. Here, we briefly survey truth finding schemes for projects in 
the commercial and academic domains, which will then be ported to Blockchain in the 
subsequent section. 
In the corporate world, RTD is often carried out within a closed circle of workers, managers 
and assessors (Figure 3). The technological idea or application case is based on an 
(assumed) understanding of a functional principle or market context. With the funding raised, 
staff is hired and resources for product development and its commercial exploitation 
procured, which is monitored by the stakeholders and boards appointed by them. Truth 
finding at the root of decision making is thus based by “skin in the game” of investors, 
management and employees, e.g., in terms of assets, stock options, career opportunities or 
salaries. 
 
Figure 3 Projects are traditionally organised in a linear fashion from starting with idea creation, advancement into 
a business plan, attracting funding. Teams and infrastructure are set up to execute work packages (WPs) which it 
(self-)validates. The results the then exploited through various avenues, e.g., by direct sales of a product, 
licencing or, in particular in academia, by publishing for building up reputation in the community. 
In science, a panel of uninvolved peers evaluates of the proposal, its implementation plan 
and the appropriateness of requested funding. Upon their positive review, a designated 
group of (internal) researchers, e.g., recruited from a closed research group or consortium, 
runs the project, and disseminates its outcomes within the scientific community. 
Transparent documentation of materials, methods and results is at the heart of finding “truth” 
in academic publishing [84], where a 2-stage process is usually enacted: upon submission, 
journal editors appoint independent experts to assess the quality and originality of the 
manuscript. Post acceptance, the entire scientific community is invited to validate the paper, 
so flawed or fabricated results are quickly disguised, especially on topics of wider-ranging 
relevance. Other than in the commercial world, errors mainly affect scholarly reputation 
rather than financial penalties, so that legal sanctions are mostly enforced for gross 
misconduct or deliberate fraud. Compared to the commercial RTD path displayed in Figure 
2, primarily the validation stage is crowdsourced in academia. 
  
Blockchain Toolbox 
Having its origin in the first popular cryptocurrency Bitcoin launched by the famous white 
paper authored in 2009 by the pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto” [3], blockchain technology 
has already impressively succeeded to implement financial transactions on its 
cryptographically safeguarded distributed ledger technology (DLT). Boosted by release of 
Ethereum’s virtual machine (EVM) which can execute smart contracts a few years later [5], a 
plethora of projects continues to break new grounds in decentralised finance (“DeFi”) [85]. 
Opinions of investors on the solidity and prospects of “crypto” tend to largely diverge [86]. 
A broad range of commercial projects on advancing blockchain technologies are driven by 
companies and foundations [87-90]; even more, projects pursuing goals that are shared by 
communities, referred to as “Commons”, are carried out by a diverse range of loosely 
organised groups of volunteers. Management and governance are enacted by blockchain-
backed tools for stake-based decision making, governance and arbitration [13]. The 
blockchain community also seeks to extend the trust without middleman community to 
encode entire Decentralised Autonomous Organisations in smart contracts. These “DAOs” 
[13, 91-93] bear great promise to (self-)organise conception, fundraising, selection, 
management, monitoring and governance. 
As a key advantage, Blockchain supports project funding of projects by seigniorage [94], or 
the privilege to issue new money, typically in the form of project-specific initial coin offerings 
(ICO) which issue tokens [95] that may be traded against other crypto- or fiat currencies at 
various exchanges. Yet, there are still some regulatory issues to be addressed [96]. 
In the realm of science and RTD, several blockchain portals support scientific publishing [97, 
98], research and technology development [99, 100]. Blockchain tools have been developed 
for aggregating and exchanging data on the state of the world, e.g., obtained from 
simulation, historical records and “Internet of Things (IoT)” sensor netwoartifrks [101, 102]. 
Also non-fungible tokens (NFTs) [103, 104] which might be applied to protect intellectual 
ownership, e.g., of microfluidic design elements. 
Establishing trust at the heart of blockchains themselves relies on crowd-based “skin in the 
game” mechanisms referred to as proof-of-work and (delegated) proof-of-stake, respectively. 
In the meantime, the blockchain community has created an ample ecosystem reaching 
beyond the social Web2.0 encompassing formalised reputation and staking schemes [12], 
idea promotion [105], bounties [16], token bonding curves [20, 106] and curation markets 
[18]. They incentivise objective vetting of experts via their immutable track record on 
reputation and community-based validation of technological concepts. 
Crowdsourcing 
Project Structure 
We now outline how the previously introduced “Wisdom of the Crowds” and Blockchain 
technologies can be combined to organise projects on open technology platforms with the 
example of Lab-on-a-Disc. As opposed to a linear project in Figure 2, such an RTD project, 
as represented in Figure 4, the smart-contract and skin-in-the-game backed open platform 
allows to tap into the crowd for all stages along value creation. 
  
 
Figure 4 Involvement of the “Crowd” along the entire value creation from idea to delivery and exploitation. 
Prediction markets for planning are backed by collective intelligence while for work and validation on RTD and 
supply chain are crowdsourced through competitive parallelisation as outlined in in green-framed box and further 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
Similar to architectural competitions, initial idea generation, e.g., an internal team, can be 
boosted by inputs from a vast pool of clever brains. Blockchain provides time-stamping such 
IP on its unforgeable ledger, and smart contracts can establish clear-cut participation, e.g., 
on shares of future revenues or licence royalties. Skin in the game schemes such as 
reputation and staking of assets invigorated by prediction markets can then support sound 
planning including the required investment, which might also be raised by crowdfunding 
mechanisms, seigniorage and token economies. 
Competitive Parallelisation 
For the following RTD phase and the supply chain, much of the work, expertise, 
infrastructure and services, at least the parts which are uncritical for the USP of the eventual 
product, should be crowdsourced on the basis of an open platform model. While trust in 
accompanying financial transaction is assured by “programmable money” in the form of 
smart contracts on the (e.g., Ethereum) blockchain, best possible “truth” on outcomes in the 
physical world is found through competitive parallelisation of deliverables and their validation 
(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 Competitive parallelisation. A system integrator or buyer crowdsources the work, e.g., on RTD or 
manufacture from independent players. The buyer selects a subgroup of players according to their offers. The 
  
outcomes are ranked, as much as possible, by a validation panel according to quantitative Key Performance 
Indicators. Bidders can increase their chance of acceptance by staking while quality work is rewarded by assets 
and reputation. 
In more detail, the deliverable of a work package (WP) should be described, as much as 
possible, by objectively assessable criteria such as quantitative Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) and associated methods of their characterisation. These descriptors are posted with 
the reward scheme or bounty to attract offers from (independent) players. Buyers then select 
a subset of these proposals for concurrent execution. Their deliverables are then evaluated 
and ranked, e.g., by a panel, and then remunerated with assets and reputation according to 
a pre-defined, transparent scheme that is immutably recorded on the blockchain.  
Buyers, workers and validators can complement their requests or bids by blockchain 
enabled staking and reward schemes, e.g., in form of fiat-convertible assets and quantified 
reputation which are formally managed by smart contracts on the tamper-free and 
transparent DLT. Decision making for conflict resolution may be implemented by blockchain-
backed arbitration mechanisms [13, 107]. Overall, such competitive parallelisation thus 
extends the peer-review process known from academic publishing by crowdsourcing of WPs 
to enrich intellectual contributions, the skill set, infrastructure, equipment, bandwidth and 
flexibility of the human resources and infrastructure. 
At first glance, the parallelised approach in Figure 5 seems to be more costly than the linear 
scheme in Figure 3. This would certainly hold assuming equal work efficiencies amongst 
both approaches. However, experience tells that running a highly diverse interdisciplinary 
project with an internal team often leads to significant gaps in competences and delays on 
deliverables, especially in the technologies that reside outside the main technological or 
commercial enablers. To give a simplified example, crowdsourcing competence leaders at 
triple rate of an internal resource significantly enhances quality and speeds of delivery by a 
factor of 10, so charging three expert players in parallel for a given work package is likely to 
deliver at roughly the same overall cost, while substantially improving quality, credibility and 
speed of delivery. 
Bestowed with the “trust” and “truth” through the blockchain and streamlining by the open 
platform concept, participation in RTD and supply chains is not restricted to full-fledged 
organisations, but reaches out to talent, knowledge and workforce of non-institutionalised 
individuals, e.g., through “hackathons” [108] or “citizen science” [109]. Fast emerging trends 
like Fab Labs [110] for making “things”, e.g., by 3D printing, cloud-based access to software, 
supercomputing, artificial intelligence (AI) and Big Data solutions [111, 112] are likely to 
further globalise and somewhat democratise value creation. 
Trends & Challenges 
Platform Strategies for Supply Chain Resilience, Responsiveness and 
Reconfigurability 
The blockchain-backed open platform concept follows strong trends in globalisation and 
regulation, in addition to advances in digitalisation and data analytics, which are generating 
business opportunities in terms of novel value creation [113]. These drivers have formed an 
environment in which many firms are encountering new challenges and opportunities in 
traditional supply chain practices, for instance, in enhancing its supply chain resilience, 
responsiveness, and reconfigurability. A common thread recently emphasised by leading 
international multinational corporations (e.g., Cisco, Coca-Cola, Jaguar Land Rover) is the 
need to connect, network and collaborate across supply chains – in developing a ‘cleverer 
together’ operating philosophy; in designing supply chains to be more agile and customer-
  
focused; exploiting the potential of digitalisation (e.g., blockchain for governance) and 
addressing the environmental impact of existing supply chain designs [114]. This is now 
further impacted by the complexities of the ‘new normal’, as such firms struggle to assess 
and rebuild their global supply chains after COVID-19 [115]. 
One area of focus is to develop open platform strategies for (re-)distributed manufacturing 
(RDM), i.e., ‘the ability to personalize product manufacturing and deployment at multiple 
scales and locations, be it at the point of consumption, sale, or within production sites’ [116] 
to promote supply chain resilience, responsiveness, and reconfigurability. RDM can also 
have a democratising effect on participation at a socio-economic level [117]. Here, new 
‘Circular Economy 4.0’ operating principles have been developed that capture the interplay 
between digital technologies  and circular supply chain designs based on centralised – semi-
centralised – decentralised configurations [118]. In promoting open access to, e.g., ‘asset 
libraries’ of manufacturing processes and simulation methods, these configurations and 
operating principles lend themselves to open technology platforms for the crowdsourcing of 
supply chain including RTD, through Blockchain.  
This is in line with moves towards interdisciplinary approaches involving ‘innovation 
ecosystems’ of diverse actors - ranging from skilled individuals (the ‘citizen scientist’; the 
‘garage entrepreneur’) to more emerging small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and well-
established firms. Economic activity does not necessarily translate to direct support of 
‘micro-innovators’, for example, in do-it-yourself (DIY) biotechnology-type RTD contexts 
[119]. Hence, open platform strategies can advance the emergence of a network of 
entrepreneur archetypes to collectively solve intractable challenges, by drawing on the 
philosophies of ‘open science’ [120] and ‘collective intelligence’ [121]. 
Our blockchain-backed open platform concept features important aspects of both RDM and 
the ‘innovation ecosystem’, such as providing access to local resources, exemplified by 
enhanced user participation across technology development, fabrication and supply. These 
mechanisms are typically enabled by digitalisation, virtualisation and new production (and 
analytical) technologies. We extend RDM by crowdsourcing upfront RTD and inclusion of 
non-corporate entities, e.g., empowering citizen science communities to avail of a resilient 
supply chain network of assets. 
Challenges & Solutions 
There are still various bottlenecks that stymie a seminal breakthrough of blockchain 
technologies. In the public eye, the volatility of cryptocurrencies represents a critical 
downside; meanwhile, a number of stablecoins has been issued which are hard- or soft-
pegged to fiat currencies [122-126]. Also solutions to increase scalability, transaction 
throughput [127-131] and interconnectivity [101, 132] and compliance with financial 
regulators [133] have been developed. 
Scamming, exploits, and poor governance constitute major setbacks for any project. 
Blockchain has already suffered, e.g., through the notorious hack of “The DAO” (Đ), the 
biggest crowdfunded project at its time having raised over $150 million from its more than 
10,000 supporters [93, 134] in 2016. Since then, smart contract security and other mitigation 
techniques for DAOs have been massively improved, and even larger projects raising 
several billion dollars have been launched [135, 136]. 
Similarly, the “code is law” paradigm propagated by some hardcore blockchain communities 
might clash with legislation, and may undermine contingency plans usually required to 
mitigate the fall-out of unintended events, for instance, related to program bugs and abuse. 
  
More recent technologies and networks, such as Telos [137], utilise readily upgradable 
smart contracts, and token holders appoint arbitrators [107, 138].  
Most USPs of blockchain application are difficult to convey to the wider public, and 
participation often goes through user interfaces, such as decentralised applications 
(“DApps”) [139, 140], which may only be handled by possessing a certain level of 
technological understanding. This limits the creation of a critically sized user base for which 
the operation of blockchain concepts make sense [141]. For similar reasons, it is difficult to 
provide test beds including larger number of players which sufficiently represent all facets of 
the real-world user base [142, 143]. There is good progress on simulation tools [144].  
Furthermore, institutional anchoring and compliance with existing legal frameworks, e.g., on 
corporate structure, equity and taxation, are, for the most part, not solved in a satisfactory 
fashion, yet [96]. Still, there are various governments evaluating their benefits and options 
for their legal embedding [91, 145, 146]. 
With the growing awareness for protecting the global ecosphere, there is somewhat valid 
public concern regarding the sizeable power consumption underpinning the protection of 
first-generation blockchains by “Proof of Work”; alternative “Proof-of-Authority” [98],  “Proof 
of Stake” or more sophisticated “Delegated Proof of Stake” [147] decisively reduce the 
environmental impact. 
Summary, Conclusions & Outlook 
This paper synergistically combines blockchain-endowed incentivisation mechanisms and 
concepts for finding trust and truth rooted in skin-in-the-game, collective intelligence, 
prediction markets and competitive parallelisation mechanisms with an open platform 
strategy. The novel approach for value creation and supply chain formation is exemplified by 
the Lab-on-a-Disc platform where it harmonises technology development for efficient 
crowdsourcing of ideas, RTD, validation, infrastructure, equipment, processes and services 
from a wide range of participants including corporations, institutions and individuals. The 
strategy is particularly suited for accelerating and de-risking commercialisation of highly 
interdisciplinary applications by smaller players requiring early investment and fast 
innovation for rapid market entry. 
In addition to companies or research organisations, such RTD and product projects may 
also be managed in the form of a Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO) that are 
entirely run by a crowd of stakeholders through blockchain-enabled tools for governance and 
crowdfunding. Apart from commercial objectives, such DAOs have also been suggested for 
grass-roots driven non-for-profit initiatives on global Commons [148], e.g., in the context of 
disaster prevention like pandemics or “Saving the Planet” [149]. They also well align with 
trends such as new models of collaboration and re-distributed manufacturing (RDM), 
globalisation / democratisation / decentralisation of value creation, data ownership, access 
and exploitation, and the future or work. 
With all prospects, the advancement, validation and convergence of its underlying 
technologies, packaging the resulting potential benefits into a compelling message to the 
general, presently widely apathetic public is urgently required. Also tapping into decisive 
economies-of-scale effects still represents major bottleneck challenge to the breakthrough of 
blockchain beyond decentralised finance (DeFi). 
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